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11 U.S.C. § 541 AND D&O INSURANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
“INSURED VERSUS INSURED” EXCLUSION IN A
BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT FOLLOWING INDIAN HARBOR
ABSTRACT
Directors and Officers insurance has been a mainstay for most corporations
for years. Included in most D&O insurance policies is what is referred to as an
“insured versus insured” exclusion which prohibits an insured from filing suit
against another insured. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code’s creation of an
estate has created a dichotomy amongst courts plagued with determining
whether claims filed by a post-petition debtor or on a post-petition debtor’s
behalf by a trustee or trust should be covered under a D&O policy including an
“insured versus insured” exclusion. The ones most effected by such a trend are
not the fortune 500s of the world, but startups and emerging companies which
will face stiffer costs leading to a greater likelihood of failure. Basing premiums
on the risk a particular insured poses, insurance providers are likely to increase
premiums in an uncertain legal environment. Couple this with the likelihood of
an economic correction on the horizon, and a trend of increased premiums is
ever more likely.
This Comment first looks at the history of D&O insurance and the
emergence of “insured versus insured” exclusions. Next, this Comment offers a
microcosm of the current dichotomy amongst courts, by examining the majority
and dissenting opinions of Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Zucker. Second, this
Comment analyzes exceptions to “insured versus insured” exclusions that have
been making their way into D&O insurance policies and how courts have
historically treated claims brought by debtors in possession compared to claims
brought by trustees. This Comment concludes by proposing a four step approach
courts should take when tasked with determining an “insured versus insured”
exclusion’s applicability. Step four of the approach includes a recommended
“Modified Factors Test,” which builds on a similar concept first suggested
years ago by Michael D. Sousa.
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INTRODUCTION
Directors and Officers liability insurance, often referred to as D&O
insurance, covers director and officers for claims against them during their time
serving on a board of directors or as a corporate officer. D&O insurance
continues to be a mainstay for most corporations in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis and beyond. With the frequency of securities class action lawsuits
increasing steadily from 2011 through 2015, the likelihood of a corporation
facing such a suit is the highest it has ever been.1 Corporations in the life sciences
and technology industries have felt the brunt of these suits.2 With a greater
likelihood of corporations facing a lawsuit, inconsistency amongst courts as to
how to treat certain provisions within a D&O policy (in this case following a
bankruptcy filing by the insured company), comes with inconsistency in
determining the risk of litigation a particular company poses. Without a more
consistent approach, insurance companies will likely raise premiums on
corporations taking out D&O insurance policies. Companies operating at low
margins, most notably, startups and smaller organizations, will face the greatest
impact. Increased premiums which cause these companies to forego D&O
insurance due to fiscal concerns could result in qualified individuals becoming
reluctant to accept directors, officers, or board positions out of fear of being
personally liable down the line. Such reluctance could result in a chilling
effect—slowing startup growth and stifling innovation.
The concept of D&O insurance began in the 1930s in the wake of the Great
Depression, following the inception of the U.S. Securities Act and the
Investment Company Act.3 However, it was not until the 1970s that D&O
insurance became commonplace, a consequence of increased litigation against
the boards of corporations in the late 1960s.4 D&O’s “fundamental purpose
[being] to shift by contract to an independent third party—the insurance
carrier—a portion of the risk arising out of actions taken both by the
corporation’s officers and directors in their official capacity and by the
corporation itself in connection with securities law matters.”5

1
Kevin LaCroix, D&O Liability: More Litigation Globally against a Broader Range of Defendants, THE
D&O DIARY (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.dandodiary.com/2016/09/articles/international-d-o/do-liabilitymore-litigation-globally-against-a-broader-range-of-defendants-2.
2
Id.
3
Kristopher Marsh, A Short History of D&O Insurance, DISCOVER D&O (June 8, 2015), https://www.
discoverdando.com/a-short-history-of-dando-insurance.
4
Id.
5
1 GILLIAN MCPHEE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE §5.04(2) (2005).
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Commonplace within a D&O insurance policy is what is known as an
“insured versus insured” exclusion.6 “[A]n ‘insured versus insured’ exclusion
bars coverage [by an insurer under an insurance policy] for claims made by one
insured under the policy, for example, the corporation, against another insured
under the same policy, for example, the corporation’s directors and officers.”7
Although questions surrounding the applicability of the “insured versus insured”
exclusion typically arise in the context of derivative suits,8 so too can it become
an issue in bankruptcy.9 To this point, a circuit split exists regarding the issue of
whether a lawsuit brought against a corporation’s former or current directors and
officers brought by a debtor in possession, trustee, creditors’ committee, courtappointed trustee, or post confirmation liquidating trustee, triggers the “insured
versus insured” exclusion in a D&O insurance policy held by a corporation. The
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits concluded that an “insured
versus insured” exclusion bars coverage when a post-petition entity files suit
against directors and officers covered under a corporation’s D&O insurance
policy.10 In contrast, the First, Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits concluded
that an “insured versus insured” exclusion is not applicable in the
aforementioned circumstances.11 The Seventh Circuit declined to rule on the
issue;12 the Tenth Circuit has yet to be tasked with the issue.

6
Murray v. Loewen Grp., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (citing Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 168 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 1999).
7
Michael D. Sousa, Making Sense of the Bramble-Filled Thicket: The “Insured vs. Insured” Exclusion
in the Bankruptcy Context, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 368–69 (2007).
8
See, e.g., FDIC v. BancInsure, Inc., 675 F. App’x 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2017); Voluntary Hosps. of Am.
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 859 F. Supp. 260, 263 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (interpreting the plain language of the
insured versus insured clause to exclude a derivative shareholder suit assisted by a former officer).
9
See, e.g., Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2009).
10
See Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Zucker, 860 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 2017); Redmond v. Ace Am. Ins.
Co., 614 F. App’x 77, 80 (3d Cir. 2015); Biltmore Assocs., LLC, 572 F.3d at 668; Terry v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re
R.J. Reynolds–Patrick Cty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc.), 315 B.R. 674, 682 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2003); Reliance Ins. Co.
v. Weis, 148 B.R. 575, 583 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
11
See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. FDIC, 723 F. App’x 764, 766 (11th Cir. 2018);
Segner v. Admiral Ins. Co. (In re Palmaz Sci., Inc.), Nos. 16-50552-CAG, 17-05027-CAG, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS
1659, *38 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. June 4, 2018); Cohen v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re County Seat Stores, Inc.),
280 B.R. 319, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Providence Cmty. Action Program, Inc.,
No. 15-388 S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, *11 (D.R.I. Jan. 24, 2017) (determining that, although relying on
split precedent within the First Circuit, under the circumstances, a Rhode Island receiver is not working “on
behalf of: the prepetition entity, and therefore not subject to the insured-versus-insured exclusion).
12
See Ha 2003, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re HA 2003, Inc.), 310 B.R. 710, 714–15 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004)
(failing to rule on this issue directly with the only applicable case relating to a D&O insurance policy which
expressly included an exclusion to the insured versus insured exclusion for bankruptcy purposes, therefore
rendering the issue mute).
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Representing a microcosm of the current split is the 2017 Sixth Circuit case
Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Zucker.13 In reaching a split decision, the majority and
dissent in Indian Harbor argue that contradicting applications of 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a) exist when determining whether the creation of an estate under
bankruptcy law should constitute a wholly separate entity for purposes of an
“insured versus insured” exclusion.14 Indian Harbor will be explored in greater
detail infra.15
For purposes of an “insured versus insured” exclusion’s application to
bankruptcy law, it must first be established whether language in the applicable
D&O insurance policy includes an “insured versus insured” exclusion and if
such inclusion includes any expressly stated exceptions. If the D&O insurance
policy contains an “insured versus insured” exclusion and does not contain an
express exception for post-bankruptcy entities or trustees, then it is important to
determine whether a debtor in possession or a trustee is bringing the suit. As will
be discussed, courts seem to agree that if a debtor in possession is bringing the
suit, too strong a potential for collusion is present, barring the suit under the
“insured versus insured” exclusion. However, the same level of agreement
amongst courts is not present when a trustee is bringing suit. As such, when a
trustee brings suit, a case-by-case analysis must be conducted to determine if a
trustee is acting on behalf of the prepetition debtor to such an extent that would
warrant the exclusion’s applicability.
Part I of this Comment will provide an overview of D&O insurance and how
it came to be commonplace from its creation in the 1930’s to its usage today.
Part II will provide a background on the “insured versus insured” exclusion and
its controversial past. Part III will provide an overview of Indian Harbor,
describing the background to the case and both the majority and dissenting
opinions. Part IV analyzes what must be considered when determining the
applicability of an “insured versus insured” exclusion in the bankruptcy context,
including the differing approaches when express language is provided in a D&O
insurance policy and the differing treatments of suits brought by debtors-inpossession and trustees. Finally, Part V reinforces the multi-factor approach
suggested by Michael D. Sousa in his 2007 Comment for the Emory Bankruptcy
Developments Journal, “Making Sense of the Bramble-Filled Thicker: The
Insured vs. Insured Exclusion in the Bankruptcy Context” with some additional
recommendations based on twelve additional years of case law.

13
14
15

Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 860 F.3d at 378.
Id.
See infra notes 44–107 and accompanying text.
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AN OVERVIEW OF DIRECTORS & OFFICERS INSURANCE

Directors & Officers insurance, or D&O insurance for short, has been a way
for businesses to “shift by contract to an independent third party—the insurance
carrier—a portion of the risk arising out of actions taken both by the
corporation’s officers and directors in their official capacity and by the
corporation itself in connection with securities law matters.”16 D&O insurance
policies have typically helped shield organizations from claims against its
directors and officers for things such as fraud, mergers, breaches of fiduciary
duties,17 and inadequate or inaccurate disclosures. In fact, it has been said that
“D&O insurance plays an important role in corporate governance in America”
because “[u]nless directors can rely on the protections given by D&O policies,
good and competent men and women will be reluctant to serve on corporate
boards.”18 This role is ever more important in filling in the gaps when
indemnification is unavailable.19
A typical D&O insurance policy consists of two types of coverage, Side A
and Side B.20 Side B coverage provides the protection for the corporation.21 Side
B coverage “compensates a corporation for expenses that it incurs as a result of
indemnifying directors and officers and that, in the absence of insurance, would
have to be paid out of corporate funds.”22 Side B coverage’s relevance to the
“insured versus insured” exclusion is that it makes the corporation an insured
under the policy, filling out either the left or right side of the “versus.”
16

MCPHEE, supra note 5.
Following default corporate law rules, director and officers owe shareholders the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty. See MCPHEE, supra note 5. The fiduciary duty of care requires the use of “the amount of care
which ordinarily careful and prudent men [and women] would use in similar circumstances and consider all
material information reasonably available in making business decisions.” Boles v. Filipowski (In re Enivid, Inc.),
345 B.R. 426, 450 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (alteration added) (internal citations omitted). The fiduciary duty of
loyalty requires “that directors act in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken is in the best interests
of the corporation, and that directors be both disinterested and independent.” 1 STEVEN M. HAAS, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE §4.03(2) (2005) (“The essence of the duty of loyalty is that ‘[c]orporate
officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests . . . [A]n undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict
between duty and self-interest.”).
18
MCPHEE, supra note 5 at § 5.04(1) (citing In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 354 F. Supp. 2d 455, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
19
Id. (Stating that indemnification may not be available in situation such as after a corporation has filed
for bankruptcy or following a change in control when a new board of directors is unwilling to authorize
indemnification of outgoing directors or officers).
20
See id. (D&O insurance policies can also have three coverage types: direct coverage to directors and
officers, reimbursement for indemnification payments made by the corporation, and entity coverage. For
purposes of the “insured versus insured” exclusion, the inclusion of the third type of coverage is unnecessary).
21
Id.
22
Id.
17
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While Side B coverage has its place, Side A coverage is more important in
the context of the “insured versus insured” exclusion. This side provides
protection for the executives as “standard ‘Side A’ portion of a primary D&O
policy protects insured directors and officers against certain types of losses
against which the corporation does not or cannot indemnify them.”23 While
D&O insurance is subject to public policy limitations, it still typically provides
an alternative source of payment for corporations when indemnification is
unavailable. However, D&O insurance policies generally include exclusions,
one of which is the basis for this Comment. As previously stated, D&O
insurance helps fill the gap when indemnification is unavailable, and Side A
coverage is how this is achieved.24 In 2008, this need increased in Schoon v.
Troy, where a Delaware court decided that nothing barred a corporation from
revising their bylaws in the future.25 This decision set the precedent that
corporations could revise their bylaws to the detriment of former directors and
officers, potentially putting them at personal risk due to a lack of
indemnification.26 This personal risk could be mitigated by a D&O policy as its
coverage extends for future lawsuits against those insured.27 For this reason,
according to a Towers Watson Director and Officers Liability Survey, Side A
coverage is the most widely purchased component of a D&O insurance policy
by organizations.28
II. THE INSURED VERSUS INSURED EXCLUSION
A. General History
Most directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policies contain an “insured
versus insured” exclusion, which “precludes coverage for claims brought by or
on behalf of or at the direction of any of the insureds . . . .”29 For example, a
23

Id.
Id. (stating that indemnification may not be available in situations such as after a corporation has filed
for bankruptcy or following a change in control when a new board of directors is unwilling to authorize
indemnification of outgoing directors or officers).
25
See Schoon v. Troy, 948 A.2d 1157 (Del. Ch. 2008).
26
Id.
27
Jeanne Oronzio Wermuth, Why Purchase Side ‘A’ Directors & Officers Liability Coverage? INS.
JOURNAL (June 18, 2012), https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/mag-features/2012/06/18/251462.htm.
28
Id. (“Of its 401 survey respondents (public, private and nonprofit), 86 percent purchased side ‘A’
coverage, either on its own or in addition to either side ‘B’ (coverage for the organization’s indemnification of
its directors, officers or members) or side ‘B’ and side ‘C’ (coverage for suits brought directly against the
organization); 57 percent purchased excess side ‘A’ or side ‘A’ DIC policies. The vast majority of organizations
cited the breadth of the coverage under the excess/DIC side ‘A’ policies as their main reason for making that
purchase. These percentages increase each year.”).
29
Larry P. Schiffer, Insured v. Insured Exclusion in Directors and Officers Policies, INS. AND
24
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corporation filing suit against one of its former directors for a case arising during
his/her term on the corporation’s board of directors cannot then claim coverage
under its D&O insurance policy to receive a payout. Since the early 2000s,
“insured versus insured” exclusions have typically been modified to provide
coverage carve-backs for certain claims, such as derivative claims and
employment practice claims.30
As a result of the savings and loans crisis in the 1980s, the federal banking
regulators actively pursued claims against many of the failed institutions’ former
officials. Many of these claims implicated the “insured versus insured”
exclusion.31 In particular, the cases Bank of America v. Powers and National
Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Seafirst Corp. served a defining role in the now
common practice of insurance companies’ inclusion of such exclusions in D&O
insurance policies.32
In Bank of America v. Powers, Bank of America filed suit against a group of
its corporate officers based on purported “wrongful and negligent performance
of their duties and responsibilities as bank officers and employees in connection
with a series of mortgage-backed securities transactions initiated by National
Mortgage Equity Corporation.”33 Furthermore, “Bank of America also sued
Employers Insurance of Wausau and First State Insurance Company, who issued
directors and officers liability insurance policies to [the bank].”34 “[I]n its own
right,” Bank of America filed claims for indemnity, negligence, gross
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty against its director and officers.35
Claiming the insurance companies’ liability under its policies terms, Bank of
America also filed indemnity claims against the aforementioned insurance
companies.36 Ultimately settling, Bank of America received $8.2 million from
its insurers.37

REINSURANCE DISP. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.inredisputesblog.com/2017/10/insured-v-insuredexclusion-in-directors-and-officers-policies.
30
Kevin LaCroix, D&O Insurance: The “Insured v. Insured” Exclusion, INS. AND REINSURANCE DISP.
BLOG (Aug. 3, 2008), https://www.dandodiary.com/2008/08/articles/d-o-insurance/do-insurance-the-insured-vinsured-exclusion.
31
Id.
32
See supra note 7 (referencing Bank of Am. v. Powers, No. C 536-776 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 1,
1985), reprinted in David W. Ichel & Sharon O. Thompson, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Coverage: An
Overview and Current Issues, 1 SEC. LITIG. 257, 378 (Sept.–Oct. 1987)).
33
Sousa, supra note 7, at 387.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Melanie K. Palmore, “Insured v. Insured” Exclusions in Director and Officer Liability Insurance
Policies: Is Coverage Available When Chapter 11 Trustees and Debtors-in-Possession Sue Former Directors
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In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Seafirst Corp., National Union Fire
Insurance Company of Pittsburgh issued an insurance policy to Seafirst
Corporation and its subsidiary, Seattle-First National Bank in 1982.38 A
shareholder derivative suit was filed in 1983 purporting negligent
mismanagement in connection with the previous year’s losses by Seafirst’s
former directors and officers; Seafirst, after court approval, took over the
shareholder derivative action and pursued it as direct actions against the former
directors and officers.39 National Union Fire Insurance Company subsequently
argued that the policy “was not intended to and does not cover claims brought
by Seafirst itself against former officers and directors of Seafirst,” in filing for
declaratory judgement.40 Seafirst’s argument was unsuccessful, however, as the
court disagreed:
[a]fter carefully reviewing the language of the policy, the court
concludes that the policy plainly and unambiguously covers direct
actions by Seafirst itself against its own directors and officers.
According to the policy terms, National Union must pay for loss
suffered as a result of ‘any claim or claims’ against the directors and
officers. The phrase ‘any claim or claims’ clearly includes direct
actions, and no other provision in the policy purports to limit the scope
of the phrase so as to exclude them from coverage.41

Not surprisingly, the outcomes of Bank of America and Seafirst caused a
change in many policies, explicitly barring coverage for claims commenced by
the insured company itself against its own directors and officers42 in the hopes
of preventing collusion or “friendly” lawsuits “in which an insured [company]
would in essence ‘force’ its insurer to pay for the poor business decisions of its
officers or directors.”43

and Officers?, 9 Bankr. Dev. J. 101, 111 n.47 (1992) (citing Peter Waldman, Bank of America Settles Suits
Tied to Losses, Posts Gain on Sale of Bank-Firm Stake, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1988, at 12.
38
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., No. C85-396R, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28065 at *1
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 1986).
39
Id. at *3–*4.
40
Id. at *4.
41
Id. at *15.
42
See Sousa, supra note 7 at 388.
43
Id. (referencing Township of Ctr. v. First Mercury Syndicate, Inc., 117 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1997).
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III. INDIAN HARBOR INS. CO. V. ZUCKER
A. Background & Case Facts
In Indian Harbor Insurance Co. v. Zucker, Capital Bankcorp, a Michigan
holding company, filed for reorganization under chapter 11 in 2012 following
three plus years of operating at a loss as a result of the 2008 financial crisis.44
Reorganization efforts stalled quickly however, and Capital Bankcorp decided
to liquidate under chapter 7 in 2013, submitting three proposed liquidation plans
in the process.45 Each plan included a provision releasing the company’s
executives from liability.46 The creditors’ committee objected this release, and
asked the bankruptcy court to grant the committee derivative standing to sue the
company’s executives for breach of their fiduciary duties to the company.47 The
court denied their motion.48 Negotiations continued, and a liquidation plan was
agreed upon in 2014.49 The plan “required Capitol to assign all of the company’s
causes of action to a Liquidating Trust, which could pursue those claims on
behalf of creditors.”50 The plan limited prepetition liability to the amount
recovered from Capital Bancorp’s existing liability insurance policy, while
eliminating any personal liability for conduct occurring post-petition.51 Capital
Bankcorp had taken out a prepetition, one-year management liability insurance
policy through Indian Harbor in September 2011; said policy was extended
multiple times post-petition.52 Per the policy, “Indian Harbor agreed to pay for
any ‘Loss resulting from a Claim first made against the Insured Persons’—a
group that included Capitol’s directors, officers, and employees—‘during the
Policy Period . . . for a Wrongful Act.’”53
Importantly, the policy excluded coverage for “‘any claim made against an
Insured Person . . . by, on behalf of, or in the name or right of, the Company or
any Insured Person,’ except for derivative suits by independent shareholders and

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Zucker, 860 F.3d 373, 374 (6th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 374–75.
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
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employment claims.”54 Such an exclusion is commonly referred to as a “insuredversus-insured exclusion.”55
In August 2014, the Liquidation Trustee filed suit against several executives
of Capital Bankcorp for $18.8 million, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty owed
to the company.56 Indian Harbor, after getting word of the suit, responded by
filing a diversity action against the Liquidation Trustee and the executives of
Capital Bankcorp, and sought a declaratory judgment which argued they had no
obligation to cover damages from the suit because the claim fell within the
insured-versus-insured exclusion.57 The district court held that the insuredversus-insured exclusion applied.58 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s holding via split decision.59
B. Majority Opinion
Judge Sutton authored the majority opinion.60 Sutton first references the
Ninth Circuit case Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. establishing
a limit to a corporation’s reliance on D&O insurance.61 In referencing Biltmore,
Sutton notes “[a] company . . . cannot hope to push the costs of mismanagement
onto an insurance company just by suing (and perhaps collusively settling
with) past officers who made bad business decisions.”62
Sutton begins his analysis by looking at the contract terms in question, and
considers a simplified application of including the “insured versus insured”
exclusion.63 Sutton notes that “[h]ad Capitol sued the Reids for mismanagement,
that would be a claim ‘by’ the Company (an insured person) against its own
officers (also insured persons)[,] the exclusion would bar the claim . . . .”64 In
determining the issue in dispute, Sutton compares the simplified application to
case’s fact pattern, concluding that while the claim’s objects are equivalent (the
officers), the claimant is no longer the Company, but instead the Liquidation
Trust which the Company’s rights have been assigned.65 Citing Burkhardt v.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id. Specifics of an “insured versus insured” exclusion are detailed in Section II. Supra Section II.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 375 (citing Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 860 F.3d at 375 (citing Biltmore Assocs., LLC, 572 F.3d at 670).
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 860 F.3d at 375.
Id.
Id.
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Bailey, Sutton concludes that as a voluntary assignee, the Liquidation Trust
stands in the shoes of Capitol possesses the same rights that are subject to the
same defenses; thus, the “insured versus insured” exclusion covers a lawsuit by
the Liquidation Trust “in the right” of Capitol.66
Sutton opposes the dissent’s argument, which rested on 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1), described infra, and disputed said argument’s validity before
bankruptcy.67 As Sutton says,
Capitol could not have dodged the exclusion by transferring a
mismanagement claim to a new company—call it Capitol II—for the
purpose of filing a mismanagement claim against the Reids. No matter
how legally distinct Capitol II might be, the claim would still be “by,
on behalf of, or in the name or right of” Capitol.68

The same conclusion must therefore apply to claims filed after a corporation
enters bankruptcy because the transferred claim would still have been filed “on
behalf of” the prepetition entity.69
Furthermore, Sutton argues that the dissent’s reliance on 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1) is ill-founded, citing to both Biltmore and the 1984 Supreme Court
decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.70 The Biltmore court stated that “the
debtor in possession is the debtor, and the debtor is the person”—pre-bankruptcy
Capitol—“that filed for bankruptcy.”71 The Court in NLRB rejected that a debtor
in possession is a “wholly new entity” unbound by the prepetition company’s
contractual obligations, further stating that “if the [debtor in possession] were a
wholly ‘new entity,’ it would be unnecessary for the Bankruptcy Code to allow
it to reject executory contracts, since it would not be bound by such contracts in
the first place.”72 While the Sixth Circuit previously remarked on the legal
distinction between the prepetition entity and the debtor in possession, they
further clarify this distinction in stating that “[t]he debtor and the debtor-inpossession is one and the same person, although ‘wearing two hats’—
representing its own interests as well as the interests of the bankruptcy estate—
and held that district courts should not appoint separate counsel.”73

66

Id. at 375–76 (citing Burkhardt v. Bailey, 260 Mich. App. 636, 680 N.W.2d 453, 462 (Mich. Ct. App.

2004)).
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984)).
Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663, 671 (9th Cir. 2009).
NLRB, 465 U.S. at 528.
Cle-Ware Indus., Inc. v. Sokolsky, 493 F.2d 863, 871 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Gordon Sel-Way v.
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Ultimately, Sutton agrees with the dissent that Capitol’s bankruptcy created
a new legal entity distinct from Capital itself, via the creation of the bankruptcy
estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).74 However, Sutton’s agreement ends there
as he further states that “[t]he bankruptcy estate is a nominal entity that cannot
act on its own; it needs a debtor in possession or trustee to sue on its behalf.”75
So, just as the “insured versus insured” exclusion would bar a claim brought on
behalf of Capital, so too does it bar a suit brought by the Trust.76
C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Bernice B. Donald authored the dissenting opinion.77 Donald argues
contrary to the majority stating that “[t]he assigned trustee in this case should
have the same right to be exempt from the insured-versus-insured exclusion as
a court-appointed trustee . . . [b]ecause [the majority’s] decision makes it harder
for companies to emerge from bankruptcy with a consensual plan of
reorganization . . . .”78 Quoting a 2007 comment from the Emory Bankruptcy
Developments Journal, Donald notes:
The primary intent of the development of the “insured versus insured”
exclusion was to prevent collusive lawsuits in which an insured
corporation would in essence “force” its insurer to pay for the poor
business decisions of its officers and directors by the corporation filing
an action against its own officers and directors.79

Donald further notes that “there is a split among ‘federal courts on the issue
of whether a lawsuit against a corporation’s former directors and officers
brought by a debtor in possession, trustee, creditors’ committee, or post
confirmation liquidating trustee triggers the ‘insured versus insured’ exclusion
in a directors and officers liability insurance policy[,]’” and that functionally,
there is no “distinction between an assigned trustee that a bankruptcy court has
determined is independent and does not pose a risk of collusion, and one that is
appointed by a bankruptcy court and is by nature of that appointment
independent.”80

United States, 270 F.3d 280, 290 (6th Cir. 2001) (remarking on the legal distinction between a prepetition entity
and the resulting debtor in possession).
74
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 860 F.3d at 377.
75
Id. (citing In re Lucre, Inc., 434 B.R. 807, 832 n.57 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010)).
76
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 860 F.3d at 377.
77
Id. at 378.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 379 (quoting Sousa, supra note 7, at 370).
80
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 860 F.3d at 379.
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Donald then points to a recent trend: some courts have found that a plain
language examination of the “insured versus insured” exclusion should not
extend to successors or assignees, including claims by a trustee in bankruptcy.81
Donald emphasizes such claims “are not the same claims brought ‘by’ the
Debtor under the exclusionary provision.”82 Donald then looks to the “insured
versus insured” exclusion within the Insurance Policy at issue, which states
“[t]he Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection
with any claim made against an Insured Person . . . (G) by, on behalf of, or in
the name or right of, the Company or any Insured Person . . . .”83 Discrediting
the notion that the suit brought by the Liquidation Trustee against Capitol’s
officers was made “by the Company” or on “behalf of an Insured Person,”
Donald believes the only remaining question is whether the suit was brought in
the “name or right of the Company.”84
Donald again looks to the plain language of the Insurance Policy for the
definition of the term “Company,” determining that it only includes “Capitol
Bancorp, its Subsidiaries, and 216 entities affiliated with Capitol Bancorp,
including community banks, real estate holding companies, and trust
companies[,]” and not a debtor in possession or other estate representatives.85
Donald then points to Sixth Circuit precedent which determined that the
bankruptcy estate and a debtor are separate legal entities.86 Attempting to
discredit the majority’s argument, Donald argues that said precedent comports
with fundamental principles of bankruptcy law, stating that it is “precisely the
point” that the “new-entity” argument would not work before bankruptcy since
a new entity gets formed when entering bankruptcy.87
Discrediting any arguments of fairness, Donald notes that the “new-entity”
argument is precisely the reason why many companies file for bankruptcy: in
bankruptcy, companies receive certain rights, including contractual rights, that
they would not be entitled to outside of bankruptcy.88 An example of this is the
treatment of ambiguous anti-assignment clauses in an insurance contract within

81

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
83
Id. at 380.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. (citing Sel-Way v. United States, 270 F.3d 280, 290 (6th Cir. 2001); Frank v. Mich. State
Unemployment Agency, 252 F.3d 852, 853 (6th Cir. 2007); Mgmt. Inv’rs v. United Mine Workers, 610 F.2d
384, 392 (6th Cir. 1979)).
87
Id. at 380–81 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541).
88
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 860 F.3d at 381.
82
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bankruptcy law.89 In fact, within the underlying bankruptcy case of Indian
Harbor, the court notes distinguish the debtor and the trust as separate legal
entities, stating:
It appears to this Court that movants are confused about the
relationship between the Debtor and the Liquidating Trust. The
Liquidating Trust was created by the Plan and the order confirming the
Plan. Debtor and the [Liquidating] Trust are separate legal entities,
separate counsel, separate assets and separate duties. To the extent
movants here have a claim for indemnification, it would be against
Debtors and not the [L]iquidating Trustee.90

Donald argues that under the majority decision, under which only courtappointed trustees are exempt from the “insured versus insured” exclusion,
“creditors would be required to reject any plan and instead seek appointment of
a trustee in order to preserve the ability to obtain an insurance recovery[,]” and
“the insurance company would be no better off as it would be left in the same
position, having to defend the directors’ claims.”91 While agreeing some case
law supports the majority’s notion that court-appointed trustees are exempt from
the “insured versus insured” exclusion, Donald disagrees that silence on the
issue means assignee trustees are not given the same treatment.92
According to Donald, if the majority’s decision becomes precedent, its effect
would be detrimental to a court’s efficiency in chapter 11 proceedings as it:
Send[s] a clear message to creditors in chapter 11 proceedings that if
claims against directors and officers are deemed to be of significant
value and the plan proposes to put those claims into a trust, the
creditors must not agree to a plan proposed or even agreed to by the
debtor-in-possession. Instead creditors will be required to seek the
appointment of a bankruptcy trustee, where appropriate, or they will
have to defeat the debtor-in-possession’s plan and propose their own
disclosure statement and plan . . . .93

89
See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 365–66 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that insurance
proceeds were assignable despite anti-assignment provisions in subject insurance policies).
90
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 860 F.3d at 381 (quoting Indemnification Hearing Transcript, R. 35-21, Page
ID #1205–06).
91
Id.
92
Id. Donald furthers this notion by pointing to the fact that the while the majority states a distinction
between an assignee trustee and a court-appointed trustee, this distinction is without merit as the majority failed
to provide supporting case law. Id. at 381–82.
93
Id. at 382.
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Additionally, the costs would significantly outweigh the lack of benefits from
this type of approach, because insurance companies still would be required to
defend applicable claims.94
On the topic of possible collusion issues, Donald points not to the majority’s
decision for guidance, but instead argues for evaluation of the trustee’s
independence on a case-by-case basis;95 this is similar to bankruptcy court’s
evaluation in this case when it determined the claims were made in good faith.96
Given the lack of collusion, Donald finally argues “there is no reason that the
assigned trustee in this case should trigger the insured-versus-insured
exclusion.”97
IV. ANALYSIS
In examining the circuit split on the “insured versus insured” exclusion’s
applicability in the bankruptcy context, it is important to flesh out areas where
the courts are unified in their approach. First, one must look at the text of the
exclusion itself to determine if the drafting of the D&O insurance policy can
dictate how a court should rule. Finally, one must look at differences between
how courts approach whether a debtor in possession or a trustee is the party
bringing suit.
A. Exceptions within the Exclusion
The “insured versus insured” exclusion is one of the most heavily litigated
provisions of D&O policies.98 Because of this, insurance policies are more
insured-friendly, carving back coverage for certain instances that are expressly
stated within the policy. One important carve-out in the bankruptcy context is
an exception for successors-in-interest.99 By expressly stating that an “insured
versus insured” exclusion does not apply to, for example, bankruptcy trustees,
the carve-back eliminates any question as to how a court will rule if litigation
follows. This is true unless the terms are ambiguous.100

94

Id. at 381.
Id. (citing Sousa, supra note 7, at 371).
96
Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 860 F.3d at 381.
97
Id.
98
How to Soften the Insured vs. Insured Exclusion in Your Clients’s D&O Insurance Policy, AMWINS
GROUP, INC. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.amwins.com/insights/article/how-to-soften-the-insured-vs.-insuredexclusion-in-your-client’s-d-o-insurance-policy_12-15.
99
Id.
100
Id.
95
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When an insurer relies on a policy exclusion, it carries the burden of proving
such an exception’s applicability.101 The interpretation of an exclusion’s
language within a D&O insurance policy presents a question of law.102 This
interpretation follows three guiding principles:
(1) an insurance contract, like other contracts, is to be construed
according to the fair and reasonable meaning of its words . . . (2)
exclusionary clauses must be strictly construed against the insurer
so as not to defeat any intended coverage or diminish the protection
purchased by the insured . . . and (3) doubts created by any
ambiguous words or provisions are to be resolved against the
insurer . . . .103
However, “where the terms of [the] exclusionary clause are plain and free from
ambiguity, the words [will be] construed in their ‘usual and ordinary sense’ and
not strictly against the insurer.”104
As one can tell, contract law plays a vital part in the interpretation of
insurance policies, because an insurance policy is a contract. As such, a “court’s
duty is to ascertain the intent of the parties [at the time of contracting] as
manifested in the language of the agreement.”105 Additionally, the “reasonable
expectations” doctrine plays a role, furthering the importance of party intent at
the time of drafting the contract when determining the applicability of certain
exclusions within a policy.106 In fact, in 1998, the Supreme Court of Iowa
described the application of the “reasonable expectations” doctrine when dealing
with an exclusionary clause, stating:
In a fundamental sense, of course, [withdrawing with the policy’s left
hand what is given with its right] is the proper function of any
exclusion clause in an insurance policy. The reasonable expectations
doctrine does no violence to this proper function by its limited
intrusion into it. The doctrine means only that when, within its metes
and bounds definition, an exclusion acts in technical ways to withdraw
101

Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hercules Bldg. & Wrecking Co., 619 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 568 N.E.2d 631, 633 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
103
Id.
104
Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whelpley, 767 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
105
E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980) (internal
citations omitted).
106
See, e.g., Rightime Econometrics, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 05-1880, 2006 LEXIS 8621, *3
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2006) (“Taking the factual allegations in RTE’s complaint as true . . . I cannot conclude that
RTE’s expectation of D&O coverage for the Putnam claims is unreasonable as a matter of law. While it is not
easy to suppose that RTE could have reasonable expected coverage under the D&O clause in the absence of a
claim against an RTE officer or director, RTE’s well-pled allegation that Federal consistently represented as
much to RTE and thereby induced RTE to purchase the policy raises at least a possibility that RTE can prove
its reasonable expectations theory.”).
102
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a promised coverage, it must do so forthrightly, with words that are, if
not flashing, at least sufficient to assure that a reasonable policy
purchaser will not be caught unawares.
The reasonable expectations doctrine is a recognition that insurance
policies are sold on the basis of the coverage they promise. When later
exclusions work to eat up all, or even substantially all, of a vital
coverage, they cannot rest on technical wording, obscure to the
average insurance purchaser. At some point fairness demands that the
coverage clause itself be self-limiting.107

When coupling the “reasonable expectations” doctrine with the propensity for
construing exclusionary clauses narrowly against the insurer, it is clear that only
an unambiguously drafted exclusionary clause demonstrating party intent at the
time of drafting the policy that is bound by such exclusion will help an insurer
meet its burden of proving such exclusion’s applicability.
B. Debtor in Possession v. Trustee
Sections 1106 and 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code define the duties of a trustee
and a debtor in possession respectively.108 Although Sections 1101(1) and 1116
seem to treat debtors-in-possession and trustees as equals, further analysis of
Sections 1106 and 1107 together prove otherwise, especially for purposes of the
“insured-versus-insured exclusion’s” applicability in bankruptcy.109
Section 1106(a) lists the duties of a trustee appointed under Section
1101(1).110 While Section 1107(a) references Section 1106(a) when listing the
duties of a debtor in possession, it does so with specific limitations.111 Other than
disallowing a debtor in possession the right to compensation, Section 1106(a)
disallows a debtor in possession from performing the duties set forth under
Sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4).112 Sections 1106(a)(3) and (4) relate to the
investigation of the debtor’s business and the subsequent filing and transmitting
of a statement of such investigation.113 Section 1106(a)(2) is only applicable if
the debtor had previously failed to file the list, schedule, and statement required

107

Clark-Peterson Co. v. Indep. Ins. Assoc., Ltd., 492 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa 1992).
11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, § 1107 (2019).
109
11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2019) (defining debtor in possession as the debtor except when a trustee has been
appointed); §1106 (equating a debtor in possession and trustee in small business cases by giving them identical
duties).
110
§ 1106(a).
111
§ 1107(a).
112
Id.
113
§ 1106(a)(3)–(4).
108
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under Section 521(a)(1).114 Although a debtor in possession becomes a separate
entity, distinct from the prepetition debtor under Section 1107(a), this new
separate entity bears little uniqueness from its prepetition self.115 As such, there
exists the potential for conflicts of interest to discredit any self-reporting that
would be conducted if a debtor in possession were allowed to investigate and
report findings under Sections 1106(3) and (4).116
Cases regarding a suit brought by a debtor in possession in a bankruptcy
proceeding against the prepetition debtor’s directors and officers with the
existence of D&O insurance policy containing an “insured versus insured”
exclusion have been scarce. However, courts have seemed to gravitate towards
a consensus as to how to treat the situation, disallowing claims brought by a
debtor in possession.
In 1997, the District Court of Idaho faced a question concerning the “insured
versus insured” exclusion’s applicability in the bankruptcy context in Cigna Ins.
Co. v. Gulf United States Corp..117 In Cigna, Gulf United States Corp. (Gulf)
initiated, in its capacity as debtor in possession, an adversary proceeding against
several of its directors and officers following a filing for chapter 11 relief.118
Gulf had insurance policies with Continental, Fidelity, National Union, and
multiple policies with Cigna each containing an “insured versus insured”
exclusion.119 The Continental Policy stated, in relevant part, that the “company
shall not be liable to make any payment in connection with any
claim . . . brought against one or more past, present or future directors and
officers, by the corporation, its subsidiaries or successors.”120 The Fidelity
Policy stated, in relevant part, that the “Underwriter shall not be liable to make
any payment for Loss in connection with any Claim made against any of the
Insured Directors and Officers: . . . by or on behalf of the Company.”121 The
National Union Policy excluded coverage for “any claim or claims made against
the Directors or Officers: . . . which are brought by any Insured or the

114

§ 1106(a)(2).
See Bank of New England, N.A. v. Klein, 86 B.R. 897 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
116
Although self-reporting can lead to conflicts of interest, the bankruptcy court can prescribe such actions
at its discretion. See In re Blue Stone Real Estate, Constr, & Dev. Corp., 392 B.R. 897, 902 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2008).
117
Cigna Ins. Co. v. Gulf United States Corp., Case No. CV 97-250-N-EJL, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23816
(D. Idaho Sept. 11, 1997).
118
Id. at *3.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
115
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Company.”122 The Cigna Policies each contained generic adaptations of
“insured versus insured” exclusions.123 Each insurer denied coverage, arguing
that the aforementioned “insured versus insured” exclusions barred Gulf’s
ability to file suit as a debtor in possession.124
Gulf subsequently transferred the claims to a litigation trust formed “for the
purpose of prosecuting the [director and officer] claims on behalf, and for the
sole benefit of creditors designated in the plan of reorganization. The Trust
agreement specifically excluded Gulf as a beneficiary of the Trust.”125 The court,
speaking to the claims initially brought by Gulf as the debtor in possession,
stated that “once Gulf entered bankruptcy, and assumed its status as a debtor-inpossession, its relationship to its creditors and shareholders was subject to a
different set of legal obligations.”126 Additionally, the court noted that “[t]he
primary focus of the [‘insured versus insured’] exclusion is to prevent collusive
suits in which an insured company might seek to force its insurer to pay for poor
business decisions of its officers or managers,”127 and that the “insured versus
insured” exclusion did not apply where “it is clear that the underlying action is
not collusive.”128 In doing so, the court sided with Gulf, concluding that the
“insured versus insured” exclusions did not apply.129
In 2004, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
decided Stratton v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. where the court determined
whether a successor company, acting as debtor in possession, could be
considered an insured for purposes of the “insured versus insured”
exclusion.130 In Stratton, Mariner Health Group, Inc. (“MHG”), a post-acute
trauma healthcare company, purchased a $10,000,000 D&O insurance policy
from National Union for coverage from 1997 through 2000.131 The policy
contained the following “insured versus insured” exclusion:
the Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in
connection with a Claim made against an Insured:
(i) which is brought by any Insured or by the [Company, Paragon
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Id. at *3 –*4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *2 (quoting Twp. of Ctr. v. First Mercury Syndicate, 117 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1997).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *18 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at *5.
Stratton v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 03-CV-12018-RGS, 2004 LEXIS 17613 (D. Mass. Sept. 3,

2004).
131
Id. at *6. Arthur Stratton was the founder of MHG which was acquired by Paragon Post Acute Network,
Inc. (Paragon) in 1998. Id. at *4.
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Health Network, Inc. or Mariner Post-Acute Network, Inc. or
successor company thereof or any Subsidiary or affiliate thereof]; or
which is brought by any security holder of the Company . . . or
successor company thereof . . . , whether directly or derivatively,
unless such security holder’s Claim(s) is instigated and continued
totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or
assistance of, or active participation of, or intervention of, any Insured
or the Company . . . or successor company thereof . . . .132

The court noted that “[t]he policy defined an ‘Insured’ as any past, present or
future duly elected or appointed directors or officers of the Company . . . or
successor company thereof . . . .”133
Mariner Post-Acute Network, Inc. (“MPAN”), the company resulting from
an acquisition of MHG by Paragon Post Acute Network, Inc., took out its own
D&O insurance policy which provided coverage from 2001 through 2002.134
Having a similar “insured versus insured” exclusion, this policy also included a
section which defined the term “Company” to include “the Named Corporation
that emerges from Bankruptcy.”135 MPAN and MHG filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy in 2000.136
Following the filing, a lawsuit was brought against four officers and
directors of MHG which National Union refused to cover, claiming that MHC
is the successor to MHG and MPAN.137 Looking at the D&O policy, the District
Court of Massachusetts examined the rationale behind “insured versus insured”
exclusions, determining that it is “to protect insurers from collusive lawsuits by
corporations trying to recoup corporate losses by attributing them to the
wrongdoing of directors and officers who, if insured, have nothing to lose by
taking the blame.”138 The District Court of Massachusetts further noted that
because MHC was an ongoing enterprise, any recovery would be paid to MHC,
thus creating an absence of truly adverse parties.139 As such, the District Court
of Massachusetts determined that the successor company constituted an insured
based on the policy and therefore coverage was excluded.140

132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *18.
Id. at * 21–23.
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In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided
Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.141 In Biltmore, Visitalk.com,
Inc. (Visitalk) filed for chapter 11 relief.142 Prior to filing, Visitalk had purchased
D&O insurance policies from Reliance Insurance Company and Twin City Fire
Insurance Company.143 Each policy contained the following “insured versus
insured” exclusion:
The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in
connection with any Claim made against the Directors and
Officers . . . :
(D) brought or maintained by or on behalf of an Insured in any capacity
or by an security holder of the company except:
(1) a Claim, including, but not limited to, a security holder class or
derivative action that is instigated and continued totally independent
of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active
participation of, or intervention of an Insured;
(2) an Employment Practice Claim by a former Director or a present
or former Officer;
(3) a claim for contribution or indemnity if the Claim directly results
from another Claim that is otherwise covered under this Policy; or
(4) a claim by any employee(s) of the Company described in IV.(D)(2)
of the Policy.144

The aforementioned exclusion came into play when Visitalk, acting as
debtor in possession, sued a handful of its recently discharged directors and
officers for breaches of fiduciary duty.145 Biltmore Associates, who had been
appointed as a trustee within Visitalk’s bankruptcy, then filed a lawsuit against
the insurance companies after the companies refused to cover the claims brought
by Visitalk against its former directors and officers.146 Since none of the listed
exceptions to the exclusion were at play, the Ninth Circuit looked beyond the

141
142
143
144
145
146

Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 666.
Id.
Id. at 667.
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four corners of the policy, and instead looked to rationale behind the “insured
versus insured” exclusion.
In discussing the rationale behind the usage of “insured versus insured”
exclusion in D&O policies, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Because risks such as collusion and moral hazard are much greater for
claims by one insured against another insured on the same policy than
for claims by strangers, liability policies typically exclude them from
coverage. Allowing such claims would turn liability insurance into
casualty insurance, because the company would be able to collect from
the insurance company for its own mistakes, since it acts through its
directors and officers.147

Elaborating further, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[t]he exclusion protects of
course against collusion, and also against the risk of selling liability insurance
for what amounts to a fidelity bond.”148
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court discussed whether Biltmore’s
argument that Visitalk, the debtor in possession, and Visitalk, the insured
corporation, were not the same entity. The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded
that “for purposes of the insured versus insured exclusion, the prefiling company
and the company as debtor in possession in chapter 11 are the same entity.”149
The Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco as support for their conclusion.150 In Bildosco, the Supreme Court
decided, in the labor law context that “it is sensible to view the debtor-inpossession as the same ‘entity’ which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition . . . .”151 The Supreme Court also noted that “[o]bviously, if the [debtor
in possession] were a wholly ‘new entity,’ it would be unnecessary for the
Bankruptcy Code to allow it to reject executory contracts, since it would not be
bound by such contracts in the first place.”152
Assuming no expressly contrasting language in an applicable D&O
insurance policy, the applicable case law bars an entity acting as a debtor in
possession from bringing suit against the prepetition debtor’s former directors
and officers when such former directors and officers were covered by a D&O
insurance policy containing an “insured versus insured” exclusion. After
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 669.
Id.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 671–72.
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
Id. at 528.
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originally being deemed allowed in the 1990s, courts barred claims brought by
a debtor in possession against former directors and officers covered by an
existing D&O insurance policy that included a “insured versus insured”
exclusion.153 Although 11 U.S.C. §541(a) creates an estate separate to the debtor,
11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) defines debtor in possession as a debtor except when a
trustee is appointed. Given that a debtor in possession is a debtor, the name
debtor in possession acts as no more than a mere pseudonym created by the
Bankruptcy Code in the context of the “insured versus insured” exclusion, thus
barring claims brought by a debtor in possession.
But what about when a trustee is the party bringing suit? This is where the
true circuit split lies. In fact, in 2017 and 2018, courts have both barred and
allowed claims brought by trustees.154
It was not until 1992 that the first court decision addressing the “insured
versus insured” exclusion in the bankruptcy context was reported.155 In Reliance
Insurance Co. v. Weiss, Reliance Insurance Company of Illinois (Reliance)
issued D&O insurance to Bank Building and Equipment Corporation (BBC)
containing the following “insured versus insured” exclusion:
The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for loss in
connection with any claim made against the Directors and Officers by
or on behalf of a Director and/or Officer or by or on behalf of the
Company, except for stockholder(s) derivative actions brought by a
shareholder(s) of the Company other than a Director and/or Officer.156

BBC subsequently filed a liquidating chapter 11 plan.157 The Plan Committee,
who had previously been organized to implement the plan, filed a cause of action
against the former directors and officers of BBC, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty and negligence in the company management.158 Reliance denied coverage,
filing for declaratory judgment on the notion that the aforementioned “insured
versus insured” exclusion barred the suit brought by the Plan Committee.159
153
See Biltmore Assocs., LLC, 572 F.3d at 668, Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United
Operating, LLC), 540 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2008); Stratton v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 03-CV-12018-RGS,
2004 LEXIS 17613 (D. Mass. Sept. 3, 2004). But see Cohen et al. v Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. et al (In re County
Seat Stores, Inc.), 280 B.R. 319, 326 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
154
See Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Zucker, 860 F.3d 373, 374 (6th Cir. 2017) (barring a claim by a trustee).
But see Segner v. Admiral Ins. Co. (In re Palmaz Sci., Inc.), Nos. 16-50552-CAG, 17-05027-CAG, 2018 Bankr.
LEXIS 1659 at *41 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. June 4, 2018) (allowing a claim by a trustee).
155
See Reliance Insurance Co. v. Weis, 148 B.R. 575 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
156
Id. at 577.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 578.
159
Id. at 580.
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The court ultimately sided with Reliance, concluding there was no
“significant legal distinction between BBC and its bankruptcy estate, and the
action initiated by the Plan Committee was in fact brought ‘on behalf of’ BBC.
Therefore the ‘insured versus insured’ exclusion prohibited coverage under the
terms of the policy.”160 The court’s finding was based on the following notions:
(1) “the bankruptcy estate’s legal and equitable interests in property . . . rose
no higher than those of the debtor;” and (2) “the Plan Committee was
specifically authorized to ‘take whatever legal actions were necessary in the
name of and on behalf of the . . . Debtors’” by the liquidating plan and
disclosure statement.161
Conversely, in Pintlar Corp. v. Fid. & Cas. Co., Pintlar Gulf USA
Corporation (Gulf), filed an adversary proceeding against its former directors
and officers as one of the debtors-in-possession.162 Gulf subsequently demanded
coverage for this claim under their existing D&O policy, and the insurance
carrier denied coverage, claiming the included “insured versus insured”
exclusion barred such coverage.163 Subsequently, the collective debtors-inpossession entered into a trust agreement that included the assignment of their
claims against the former directors and officers to the president of Pintlar.164 The
trust agreement included a provision excluding Gulf, Pintlar, or any of their
respective surviving or successor entities from receiving any potential benefit
from the trust including those from the prosecution of the claims against the
former directors and officers.165
Regarding the aforementioned claims, both parties filed for summary
judgment, with the insurers arguing that the claims were barred by the “insured
versus insured” exclusion because “the alter ego of Gulf and Pintlar for the
purpose of the exclusion, and that the transfer of the causes of action [was]
nothing more than an assignment to avoid the exclusion.”166 The court disagreed
with the insured, holding that the claims now belonged to the creditors, “acting
through the litigation trustees . . . [,] [t]he litigation Trustees are not acting for
the benefit of the corporation, but for the benefit of the corporation’s creditors,
including the shareholders.”167

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Sousa, supra note 7, at 399 (citing Weis, 148 B.R. at 583) (emphasis added).
Id.
Pintlar Corp. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. (In re Pintlar Corp.), 205 B.R. 945, 946 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 947.
Sousa, supra note 7, at 399 (quoting In re Pintlar Corp., 205 B.R. at 948 (emphasis added)).
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In 2002, the Southern District of New York determined the applicability of
the “insured versus insured” exclusion after Alan Cohen, acting as trustee,
commenced an adversary proceeding against seven former directors and officers
of County Seat, Inc. (County Seat) for breaches of fiduciary duty, fraudulent
conveyance, corporate waste, and mismanagement.168 National Union Fire
Insurance Company of Pittsburg (National Union), whom County Seat had an
existing D&O policy with, denied coverage for the claims, arguing that the
claims brought by the trustee were being “asserted on behalf of County Seat”
and therefore the trustee must be barred from bringing such claims under the
“insured versus insured” exclusion included in the D&O policy.169
The “insured versus insured” exclusion included in the National Union
policy contained an exclusion allowing the coverage of claims brought by a
security holder against an insured if the claim is “instigated and continued totally
independent of, and totally without the . . . assistance of, or active participation
of the company.”170 The term “company” as defined in the National Union
policy referred to the “Named Corporation designated in Item 1 of the
Declarations and subsidiary thereof.”171 County Seat was the only entity listed
in Item 1.172
In siding with the trustee, the Cohen court noted they agreed with National
Union that:
the Trustee is asserting claims that belonged to County Seat as of the
date of filing its bankruptcy petition. However, the Court does not
agree that by virtue of the trustee asserting claims that at one time
belonged to the Debtor, he merely stands in the shoes of the Debtor or
has somehow assumed the identity of the Debtor.173

In reaching its decision, the Cohen court pointed to a bankruptcy trustee’s status
as a legal entity separate from the debtor.174 Further, the Cohen court noted that

168

Cohen v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Cty. Seat Stores, Inc.), 280 B.R. 319, 321 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

2002).
169

Id.
Id. at 322 (internal quotation omitted).
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 324–25.
174
Id. at 325 (citing Reiser v. Baudendistel (In re Buckeye Countrymark, Inc.), 251 B.R. 835, 840 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 2000)).
170
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a trustee’s duty is owed to the bankruptcy estate, not the debtor,175 and that only
the trustee can sue and be sued on behalf of the estate.176
In June of 2011, the First District Court of Appeals decided Yessenow v.
Exec. Risk Indem., Inc.177 In Yessenow, Jeffrey Yessenow and Vijay Patel were
former directors of iHealthcare, Inc. (iHealthcare) and Illiana Surgery and
Medical Center, LLC (Illiana).178 Illiana later renamed to Heartland Memorial
Hospital, LLC (Heartland).179 iHealthcare was the sole owner of Heartland’s
equity.180
iHealthcare purchased a D&O insurance policy from Executive Risk
Indemnity, Inc. (Executive) in 2005 that ran through October 2, 2007.181 In
January 2007, iHealthcare was brought into involuntary bankruptcy by its
creditors, and petitioned for chapter 11 relief in March 2007.182 In February
2009, the court appointed trustee-filed lawsuits against several former
iHealthcare directors, alleging mismanagement and self-dealing.183 In April
2009, Executive gave notice of their intention to deny coverage on grounds
including the policy’s “insured versus insured” exclusion. The exclusion read as
follows:
This policy does not apply to:
(E) any Claim by or on behalf of, or in the name or right of, the
Company or any Insured Person, except that this EXCLUSION
(E) will not apply to:
(1) any derivative action by a security holder of the Company
on behalf of, or in the name or right of, the Company, if such
action is brought and maintained independently of, and
without the solicitation of, the Company or any Insured
Person.
(2) any Claim in the form of a crossclaim, third party claim or
other claim for contribution or indemnity by an Insured Person
which is part of or results directly from a Claim which is not
otherwise excluded by the terms of this Policy; or

175
In re Cty. Seat Stores, Inc., 280 B.R. at 325 (citing In re Fidelity America Financial Corporation, 43
B.R. 74, 77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
176
In re Cty. Seat Stores, Inc., 280 B.R. at 325 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 323).
177
Yessenow v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc., 953 N.E.2d 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
178
Id. at 435.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 435–36.
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(3) any Claim for an Employment Practices Wrongful Act.184

In considering Executive’s argument, the trial court quoted Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., stating that “ambiguities and
doubts in insurance policies are resolved in favor of the insured, especially those
that appear in exclusionary clauses.”185 Pointing to an additional “bankruptcy
exclusion” contained in the policy, the trial court determined that “Executive
could have sidestepped any ambiguity by including trustees and debtors-inpossession in either the definition of the ‘insured’ or the language of the insured
versus insured exclusion.”186 Further, the court noted that “[b]ecause it did not
write with such specificity, the court interpreted the policy in favor of the insured
and held that neither Abrams nor iHealthcare is an insured under the policy and
that the insured versus insured exclusion does not preclude coverage.”187
Additionally, pointing to the “insured versus insured” exclusion, the trial court
determined that “whether a trustee or debtor-in-possession is an insured for the
purposes of an ‘Insured v. Insured’ exclusion is unsettled law,” rendering the
provision ambiguous and necessitating the resolution in favor of the insured.188
On appeal, the Yessenow court first agreed with the trial court, finding the
“bankruptcy exclusion” to be unenforceable because 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)
invalidates contract provisions “that are conditioned on the insolvency or
financial condition of the debtor [or] on the commencement of a bankruptcy
case.”189 Speaking to the applicability of the “insured versus insured” exclusion,
the Yessenow court differentiated the case at hand with the Biltmore case,

184

Id. at 436.
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1218 (Ill. 1992).
186
Yessenow v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc., 953 N.E.2d 433, 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). The bankruptcy
exclusion stated as follows:
185

(1) In the event that a bankruptcy or equivalent proceeding is commenced by or against the
Company, no coverage will be available under the Policy for any Claim brought by or on behalf
of:
(a) the bankruptcy estate or the Company in its capacity as a Debtor in Possession; or
(b) any trustee, examiner, receiver, liquidator, rehabilitator, conservator, or similar official
appointed to take control of, supervise, manage or liquidate the Company, or any assignee of
any such official (including, but not limited to, any committee or creditors or committee of
equity security holders).
(2) For the purposes of this endorsement, the term Debtor in Possession means a debtor under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code unless a person that has qualified under Section
322 of Title 11 of the U.S. Code is serving as trustee of such debtor.
187
188
189

Id.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 441 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §541(c)).
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explained supra, noting that unlike in the Biltmore case where a debtor in
possession attempted to bring claims against former directors and officers, a
court-appointed trustee was attempting to bring the claims.190 This court found
this distinction crucial, ultimately finding that “the trustee and the debtor
hospital are not the same entity for purposes of the insured versus insured
exclusion.”191 In doing so, the court sided against Executive finding that the
“insured versus insured” exclusion did not apply to the claims.
In 2018, the Texas Western Bankruptcy Court decided Segner v. Admiral
Insurance Company (Segner), and determined whether an “insured versus
insured” exception applied following a chapter 11 filing by Palmaz Scientific
Inc. (PSI).192 PSI, a medical technology company, had taken out a $20 million
D&O insurance policy with an “insured versus insured” exception which read
as follows:
[T]he Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in
connection with a claim made against any Insured:
(F) by, on behalf of, or in the right of any Insured in any capacity,
or any security holder of the Insured Entity, provided, however,
this exclusion does not apply to:
(1) any Claim by any security holder of the Insured Entity,
whether directly or derivatively, but only if such claim is
instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally
without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or participation of,
or intervention of any Insured.193

Following the bankruptcy filing, a Litigation Trustee was appointed.194 The
Litigation Trustee subsequently filed suit against several former officers and
directors of PSI for breaches of fiduciary duty.195 Admiral, the insurance
provider, denied coverage for the claims under the above “insured versus
insured” exception.196
Looking to the Litigation Trust Agreement, the court noted that although the
agreement itself uses assignment language, it “would be remiss to ignore the

190

Id. at 443.
Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
192
See generally Segner v. Admiral Ins. Co. (In re Palmaz Sci., Inc.), Nos. 16-50552-CAG, 17-05027CAG, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1659 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. June 4, 2018).
193
Id. at *6–8.
194
Id. at *5.
195
Id. at *6.
196
Id. at *7–8.
191
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circumstances under which [it was] negotiated.”197 As such, the court
determined that it would not be unreasonable to interpret the “assignment” of
rights not as a contractual assignment, but as a vesting of assets in order to
accomplish the effect of 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b).198
Next, the court differentiated Segner from Biltmore,199 noting that while the
language in the agreements may have been similar, a debtor in possession filed
suit in the Biltmore case as opposed to a trustee.200
Looking next to Reliance Ins. Co. v. Weiss, the court differentiated the
Missouri Bankruptcy Court’s case with its own, stating that “the terms of the
Plan differ from that of Weis in that the express purpose of this Litigation Trust
is to distribute its assets to the Litigation Trust Beneficiaries . . . not to recover
assets for Debtors’ estate for distribution to its creditors.”201
Further, the court looked to Indian Harbor.202 Unpersuaded by the
majority’s decision in Indian Harbor, the court pointed to various rationales.203
First, the court differentiated the main questions of the cases, noting that while
Indian Harbor asked whether “the Company” included a debtor in possession,
Segner asked whether a trustee constituted an insured.204 Second, the court noted
that Indian Harbor dismissed the case law holding that a court-appointed trustee
was not barred by the “insured versus insured” exclusion.205
Disagreeing with the Biltmore and Indian Harbor courts, the Segner court
followed the narrow interpretation of Bildisco & Bildisco, stating:
Obviously if the [debtor in possession] were a wholly “new entity,” it
would be unnecessary for the Bankruptcy Code to allow it to reject
executory contracts, since it would not be bound by such contracts in
the first place. For our purposes, it is sensible to view the debtor in
possession as the same “entity” which existed before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code
to deal with its contracts and property in a manner it could not have
done absent the bankruptcy filing.206

197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. at *17.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *20–22.
Id. at *24.
Id.
Id. at *29.
Id. at *29.
Id. at *29–30.
Id. at *32–33 (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984)).
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The court determined that the Bildisco & Bildisco holding should be limited
to treatment of executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. §365.207
Ultimately, the Segner court held that (1) a “[t]rustee represents an
independent and disinterested entity, . . . distinct from the debtor . . . and as such
did not ‘stand in the shoes’ of the debtor,” and (2) that classifying a debtor and
debtor in possession as separate and distinct entities for purposes of the “insured
versus insured” exclusion is not adverse to any Supreme Court precedent.208
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
While courts follow different approaches when dealing with the “insured
versus insured” exclusion’s applicability in bankruptcy, over twenty-five years
of case law as well as bankruptcy, insurance, and contract law concepts serve as
the foundations for a uniform approach courts can use when faced with such a
case. The following four step approach helps create a uniform approach for
courts to follow which will hopefully help future cases run more efficiently with
consistent results.
Step 1: Does the Applicable D&O Insurance Policy Contain an “Insured Versus
Insured” Exclusion?
The obvious first step should be determining if there is an “insured versus
insured” exclusion within the applicable insurance policy. If no such exclusion
exists within the policy, no further analysis is necessary. However, the case
likely will contain an exclusion. In this case, the court should take note of the
specific language of the exclusion, noting (1) who is defined as the insured, and
(2) any exceptions to the exclusion. As previously noted, the policy’s language
is important because contract law supersedes bankruptcy law when interpreting
the intent of the parties.
Step 2: Does any Exception within the “Insured Versus Insured” Exclusion
Apply?
Many “insured versus insured” exclusions contain exceptions allowing
certain claims brought against the insured by an insured. Some exceptions
include derivative claims by shareholders, claims by successors-in-interest,

207
Id. at *33 (quoting Cohen v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Cty. Seat Stores, Inc.), 280 B.R. 319, 326
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
208
Id. at *32.
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claims against or brought by former insureds, and employment practice
claims.209
If the applicable policy includes any such exclusion, determine if it is
applicable to the suit being brought. For example, if the policy contains an
exclusion for suits brought by a bankruptcy trustee (a type successor-in-interest),
then one must conduct no further analysis, and the suit is allowed. Again,
contract law will govern if the true intent of the parties can be discerned from
the policy without ambiguity. As such, an applicable exception within the
“insured versus insured” exclusion will allows otherwise barred claims.
Step 3: Who is Bringing the Suit?
Determining who brought the suit is vital to establishing whether a court
must conduct further analysis. If the suit is brought by a debtor in possession,
the court’s analysis should bar the suit. On the contrary, if the suit is brought by
a trustee, further analysis is necessary.
Step 4: The Multi-Factor Test
“A simple, flat rule is deliciously clear and easy to apply, but it may be
bother underinclusive and overinclusive in relation to the purpose that animates
it.”210 Such is the case when it comes to the “insured versus insured” exclusion
in the bankruptcy context. As Michael D. Sousa stated, “a completely
overriding, definitive rule such as ‘no coverage for collusive suits’ under an
‘insured versus insured’ provision would prove unworkable when applied to the
bankruptcy context, given the dynamics of the bankruptcy process and the
differing ways in which an “insured [versus] insured exclusion might arise in
litigation.”211 To combat this, Sousa proposed a four factor test in which courts
should consider when deciding whether to exclude coverage under an “insured
versus insured” exclusion.212 Sousa’s four factor test with some slight
modifications is the best and most comprehensive approach to “harmonizing
elements” of both insurance law and bankruptcy law.213
The modified four factor test is comprised of the following factors: (1) the
reasonable expectations of the parties; (2) the status of the plaintiff at the time
the claim is filed; (3) the beneficiaries of the claim; and (4) whether “true

209
210
211
212
213

See generally AMWINS GROUP, INC., supra note 98.
Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 168 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 1999).
Sousa, supra note 7, at 404 (citing Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 168 F.3d at 958).
Sousa, supra note 7, at 404–05.
Sousa, supra note 7, at 404.
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adversity” exists between the litigating parties.214
The first factor of the modified four factor test is the reasonable expectations
of the parties. While any unambiguous, expressly stated provisions of a D&O
insurance policy should have already been considered prior to even
implementing the modified four factor test, the court must consider the
reasonable expectations of the parties for any ambiguous provisions to
determine the parties’ intent when drafting the D&O insurance policy. Although
a highly sophisticated corporation should be aware of their ability to include
express language excluding the barring of certain actions by the “insured versus
insured” exclusion, that these exceptions were not included is not indicative that
the parties intended for the excluded exceptions to in fact be excluded. Some
factors to consider when determining the intent of the parties at the time of
drafting the D&O policy are as follows: (1) the existence of other express
exceptions to the “insured versus insured” exclusion itself;215 (2) the terms of
any previous D&O policies between the company and insurance company216;
and (3) the insurers standard selling practices.217
Of great importance when interpreting the intent of the parties of the
insurance policy is the doctrine of contra proferentum.218 The doctrine of contra
proferentum refers to the rule that any ambiguous language within a contract
must be construed against the drafter.219 In all insurance contracts, the insurance
company is the drafter. As such, all ambiguous language within insurance
policies must be construed against the insurance company and in favor of the
insured. In the case of the applicability of an “insured versus insured” exclusion
would mean in favor of allowing not barring coverage for the claim.
The second factor of the modified four factor test is the status of the plaintiff
214
Sousa’s proposed four factor test listed the factors as “1) whether “true adversity” exists between the
litigating parties; 2) the status of the plaintiff at the time the claim is made; 3) the identity of the beneficiaries of
the claim, or stated differently, on whose behalf are the claims being pursued; and 4) the reasonable expectations
of the parties.” Sousa, supra note 7, at 405 (The modified four factor test proposed in this Comment changes the
order of importance of the factors while adding and subtracting certain criteria from each).
215
Having a well thought out list of exclusions to the “insured versus insured” exclusion demonstrates that
the parties deliberated the true intent of what should and should not be included as exceptions and made a
conscious decision to not include some potential exceptions.
216
Looking to other policies between the company and insurer can help speak to whether additions or
subtractions were made in subsequent policies. For example, if a previous policy contained an exception to the
“insured versus insured” exclusion and subsequent policies did not, it may be indicative that the parties intended
to exclude such exception.
217
Looking into the insurers standard selling practices can indicate whether the company informs potential
clients of the possibility of including exceptions or other language in their D&O policy.
218
Tri-S Corp. v. W. World Ins. Co., 135 P.3d 82, 98 (2006).
219
Shelby Cty. State Bank v. Van Diest Supply Co., 303 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2002).
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at the time the claim was filed. This factor is identical in name to Sousa’s second
factor, but its applicability has been slightly modified.220 Sousa states that:
The applicability of an “insured versus insured” exclusion in the
bankruptcy context can perhaps best be understood as a linear
continuum, whereby the points on this continuum represent, in
sequential order, the debtor in possession, Chief Restructuring Officer,
plan trustee, bankruptcy trustee, and creditors’ committee. And while
the application of the “insured vs. insured” in a given case cannot be
predicted with mathematical certainty, the further away from the
debtor in possession on the continuum and the closer to the creditors’
committee, the more likely it is that a court will find that the “insured
vs. insured” exclusion does not apply.221

The modified four factor test removes the need to include the debtor in
possession in the analysis as recent case law seems to settle on the notion that a
debtor in possession and debtor should be treated as one in the same for purposes
of the “insured versus insured” exclusion.
All else remains consistent with Sousa’s approach, as the farther one moves
away from the debtor in possession and closer to the creditor’s committee, the
lesser the chance of a suit being brought for collusive purposes. The debtor in
possession can be the prepetition debtor itself using a mere pseudonym
attempting to conceal its identity as an insured, but none of the other listed
entities have that ability since they are not and never were the debtor.
The third factor in the modified four factor test are the identities of the
claim’s beneficiaries. As Mr. Sousa states when discussing what he too noted as
the third factor in his test, “[t]he identity of the beneficiaries of the claim, and
the corollary inquiry of on whose behalf the claim is being pursued, is the third
factor . . . .”222 Claims asserted against directors and officers can in some cases
be brought for harms against the corporation itself.223 Claims of this type could
have been brought by the prepetition debtor as the affected party.224 If brought
prior to the bankruptcy filing, these claims would obviously be barred under the
“insured versus insured” exclusion.225

220

Sousa, supra note 7, at 405.
Sousa, supra note 7, at 405. Compare Biltmore Assocs., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663
(9th Cir. 2009) with Stratton v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 03-CV-12018-RGS, 2004 LEXIS 17613 (D. Mass.
Sept. 3, 2004).
222
Sousa, supra note 7, at 409.
223
See id.
224
See id.
225
See id.
221

KRANZPROOFS_4.30.20

176

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

5/3/2020 4:13 PM

[Vol. 36

In contrast, claims asserted against the company, in its own capacity, for the
same conduct described above may have been brought by shareholders
(derivative suits) or creditors of the corporation for the harms they
experienced.226 Because claims might be brought against director and officers
on behalf of both the effected corporation or the corporation’s shareholders or
creditors, “a court can work through this problem by identifying the beneficiaries
of the causes of action should the claims prove successful, and in so doing
determine (at least in part) whether the ‘insured vs. insured’ exclusion should
apply.”227
When applying this factor, a court must remember:
If the recovery of a lawsuit against directors and officers would benefit
a constituency that would have implicated the “insured vs. insured”
exclusion if the claims had been brought in its own stead outside of the
bankruptcy context, then the “insured vs. insured” exclusion should
preclude coverage despite the happenstance of bankruptcy.228

Cirka v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburg exemplifies this
thought process.229 In Cirka, the issue before the court was “whether the
Committee brought the action ‘on behalf of’ the debtor-in-possession when the
lawsuit could have been brought by the debtor in possession itself.”230 In coming
to its conclusion, the court notes: (1) the claims belonged to the prepetition entity
and continued to belong to the post-petition estate; and (2) the derivative
standing of the Committee to pursue the claims was essentially to enforce a
corporate right.231 Ultimately, the Chancery Court concludes that the coverage
was not barred under the “insured versus insured” exclusion and stated that:
While one may view this case as one where the Committee is bringing
an action that may also be brought by the Debtor in Possession, there
is no doubt the Committee is not bringing the action “on behalf of” the
Debtor in Possession. It is simply enforcing a right belonging to the
Estate that the Debtor in Possession could have itself enforced.232

226

See Sousa, supra note 7, at 409–10.
Sousa, supra note 7, at 410.
228
Id.
229
Cirka v. National Union Fire Insurance Co, of Pittsburg, C.A. No. 20250-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS
118 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 2004).
230
Sousa, supra note 7, at 411 (citing Cirka v. National Union Fire Insurance Co, of Pittsburg, C.A. No.
20250-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS118 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 2004)).
231
Sousa, supra note 7, at 411 (citing Cirka, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS118, at *15–16.
232
Cirka, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS118, at *29.
227
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In other words, because the estate, not the debtor in possession, stood to benefit
from any recovery, the Chancery Court determined that the “insured versus
insured” exclusion did not apply.233
The fourth factor in the modified four factor test is whether “true adversity”
exists between the litigating parties. This fourth factor is identical to Mr. Sousa’s
first factor in his test.234 The goal of including an “insured versus insured”
exclusion’s within D&O insurance policies is preventing collusion in lawsuits
“such as suits in which a corporation sues its officers or directors in an effort to
recoup the consequences of their business mistakes, . . . thus turning liability
insurance into business-loss insurance . . . .”235 Evidence of such collusion
between insured will never be ascertainable and “the mere presence of covered
insureds on both sides of the ‘vs.’ is an insufficient barometer for measuring
whether the litigating parties conspired to transfer financial loss to the
corporation’s insurance carrier.”236 Therefore, to determine collusion was at play
when bringing suit, “a court should instead analyze whether the litigating parties
are truly adverse from one another, and thereby not implicating the very hazards
that the insurance carrier attempted to protect itself against by including the
‘insured vs. insured’ exclusion in the liability policy.”237
Exemplifying this approach, the decision in Conklin Co. v. National Union
Fire Insurance Co. determined that “[a]lthough National Union Fire Insurance
Company was correct in maintaining that the former officer was an insured
under the directors and officers liability policy, and thus by strict definition the
‘insured vs. insured’ exclusion applied, the court nevertheless concluded that the
exclusion did not bar coverage of the lawsuit.”238 In doing so, the Conklin court
looked to the intent behind the applicable clause within the D&O policy, not
simply the terms of the clause itself.239 Although the approach taken by the
Conklin court has been criticized both within240 and outside241 of its jurisdiction,
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the criticizing cases take a far too narrow approach, constraining themselves
solely to the plain language of the applicable D&O insurance policy.242
While the criticizing cases do rely on the well-established notion that the
interpretation of an insurance contract should be based on the plain meaning of
its terms, they fail to take note of the ambiguity in “insured versus insured”
exclusions that arises when the insured entity has previously filed for
bankruptcy. Referring to “Step 2” as described above, many D&O insurance
policies have become sophisticated enough to include express exceptions for the
“insured versus insured” exclusion. The terms of such policies are usually not
ambiguous, meaning the policy interpretation is based on its terms and nothing
more. However, given that “Step 2” precedes this modified factors test, a court
analyzing an unambiguous D&O policy would likely not even get to this point
in the analysis process. Instead, only courts tasked with analyzing D&O policies
containing ambiguous terms would look to apply this and analyze said D&O
policies using this modified four factor test. As such, Conklin’s rationale serves
as the best framework as it pertains to clauses containing ambiguity.243
In conclusion, although there is no completely uniform approach for courts
to follow concerning the applicability of the “insured versus insured” exclusion
in the context of bankruptcy that would eliminate the potential for overinclusion
or underinclusion, the four steps and modified four factor test described above
should help eliminate any profound inconsistency by courts across jurisdictions.
With such a framework in place, insurers should be able to better evaluate a
client’s litigation risk, thus reducing the likelihood of a market-wide increase in
premiums even with a potential financial downturn on the horizon.
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